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Abstract 
This paper considers the implications for education of a reworked ancient Greek 
ȱȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱȱȱȱǼǰȱ ȱȁȂȱ
comprises the objective actualisation of our intellectual, imaginative and affective 
potential. A brief outline of the main features of an ethics of flourishing and its 
potential attractions as an ethical framework is followed by a consideration of the 
ethical, aesthetic and political requirements of such a framework for the theory and 
practice of education, indicating the ways in which my approach differs from other 
recent work in the field. I argue that the teaching of philosophy in schools and 
philosophical approaches to the teaching of other subjects are ideally suited to meet 
the pedagogic requirements of individual and communal flourishing so understood, 
contributing greatly both to the understanding of what a well-lived life might be, and 
to the actual living of it. I further argue that these requirements are not only derived 
from ancient Greek philosophy but are in turn especially well-served by the teaching 
and deployment of Greek philosophy itself. My claim is not that Greek philosophy 
has all the answers, or that other philosophers and philosophical approaches should 
be excluded; it is simply that Greek philosophy offers rich resources for those seeking 
to introduce children and young people to philosophy and to foster thereby their 
flourishing in both childhood and as adults.  
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Ȃȱȱȱlourishing 
So you see how our discussion concerns that which should be of the greatest 
importance to any person, even if he has only a modicum of senseȯthat is to 
say, how one should live. (Plato Gorgias 500c)1 
ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ
and is entwined with the question of what sort of person to be. In both cases, Plato 
ȱ ȱ  ȱ  ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȁ¢ȂǱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
political questions that he addresses are situated within the framework of an ethics 
and politics of flourishing.2 ȁȂǰȱ eudaimonia, is not the same thing as 
pleasure, or even happiness. Eudaimonia ¢ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
guardian Ȃȱ ȱ t is a more objective notion than pleasure or happiness as 
currently understood, being concerned with the fullest realisation of our best 
faculties, the actualisation of our best potential. We cannot always be happyȯand 
sometimes even striving for happiness would be inappropriate, for example in the 
midst of a natural or human-made disasterȯbut we can always aim to fulfil our best 
potential as far as circumstances allow. The challenge, of course, is to decide what 
this involves: we first need to do some informed thinking about what our faculties 
are, what their best actualisation would look like, and what social and political 
conditions would facilitate such actualisation. For Plato, the faculties of our psyche 
comprise, in descending order of importance, a rational element which desires truth 
and reality, a spirited element which desires honour and success,3 and an appetitive 
element which desires food, drink, sex and money; there are in addition our physical 
capabilities. Other Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, conceive of our psychic 
faculties rather differently, although they still employ a loose distinction between 
reason, (certain) emotions and the appetites. Nevertheless, however our faculties and 
                                                          
1 See also Plato Republic řśŘǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱȱȂǯȱȱȱȱȱȱLaches 187e-188a and is almost certainly that of the 
historical Socrates. 
2 For a more detailed discussion of the ideas outlined in this section, see Hobbs (2000, pp. 50-75). 
Although there has been considerable interest in recent years in notions of flourishing as the main 
aim of education (e.g. Brighouse 2006; White 2011; de Ruyter 2015), there has not, so far as I am 
aware, been a discussion of the implications for education which stem from an analysis of the 
structure of an ethics of Platonic eudaimonia of the kind I am offering here. Even the educational 
theorists who are most influenced by the ancient Greek concept (e.g. Curren 2010, 2013; Sanderse 
ŘŖŗŘǼȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ
rather than considering the structure of eudaimonic ethics as a whole. For a helpful recent overview 
of the field see Kristjánsson (2017).  
3 The thumos or thumoeides; we will be coming back to this element of the psyche below in our 
discussion of examples and the shape of a life.  
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their best actualisation are conceived, what is in no doubt is that an ethics of 
flourishing is an agent-centred approach which is at least capable of taking on board 
the complexities of the lived human experience; for this reason it is to my mind more 
compelling than act-centred ethical theories based on notions of duty and rights (e.g. 
Kant), or of utilitarian consequences (e.g. Bentham and Mill). 
It is also an approach which considers the whole person living a whole life, and thus 
invites us to consider the structure, shape and narrative of a well-lived life; and is in 
consequence an ethical approach which has particular connections with aesthetics, 
and with stories. We may of course wonder whether the shape and order are 
illusory, and the answer will in part depend on whether we think we are able to 
sculpt order out of the messy rush of daily existenceȯbe artists of our own lives. 
Plato certainly seems to imply that this is both possible and desirable,4 and more 
recently the heavily Greek-influenced Nietzsche and Foucault have followed a 
similar path5. It is in addition an approach which requires us to consider the links 
between ethics and political theory and practice, in that Plato believes that the 
actualisation of potential, except in very rare beings of great gifts (such as Socrates), 
can only occur in certain political and social circumstances.6 While few would now 
ȱ  ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Republic of what these political 
circumstances should be, the general underlying points remain pertinent: we need a 
good education and the opportunity to debate freely in order to develop our 
intellectual and moral potential,7 and also a social setting in order to exercise virtues 
such as justice. As his pupil Aristotle succinctly expresses Ǳȱȁhe human is a political 
ȂǱ8 in other words, humans are animals naturally suited to living in the context 
of the polis, or city-state, and, as a result, ethics is a branch of political theory.9  
 
  
                                                          
4 E.g. Protagoras 326b; Republic 588a; Laws 803a-b; see Hobbs (2000, pp. 61-63; 227-230). 
5 £Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¡ȱȱThe Birth of Tragedy and The 
Gay Science: see especially GS 276, 290 and 299. For discussions of this theme in both Nietzsche and 
Foucault, see Nehamas (1985). 
6 E.g. Republic 558b. 
7 Although the ideally just state outlined by Socrates in the Republic does not itself permit freedom of 
expression, Plato as author certainly encourages it through his choice of a dialogue form in which 
the character of Socrates often debates with robustly critical interlocutors, such as Thrasymachus in 
Republic 1 and Callicles in the Gorgias. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ
detail below. 
8 Politics 1253a2-3. 
9 Ethics 1.ii 1094a26-b11. 
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Implications for education 
Some of the educational implications of an ethics of eudaimonia, suitably reworked 
for the 21st century, are already becoming clear. Education will need to receive 
appropriate political support, both in the sense of government support and support 
from political parties, and also in the broader sense of support from the local 
community, the local (modern version of the) polis.10 Through such support it should 
seek to enable children and young people to actualise all their faculties: intellectual, 
emotional and physical; furthermore, as Plato (and indeed Aristotle) believed that 
morally appropriate choices and actions depend on rationally guided emotional 
responses, such intellectual and emotional development will inevitably involve some 
moral character training too. Crucially, education should assist such actualisation of 
potential not simply as a preparation for adulthood, hugely important though this is. 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǰȱȱȱ
some tragic cases they form the entirety of it: it is vital that these years are in 
themselves a time of flourishing, in themselves richly stimulating, fun and fulfilling. 
And these stimulating and enjoyable years should help the child and young person 
start to form ideas of what a flourishing life should involve, and what kind of shape 
it might take and narrative it might follow. They should also help the child to 
understand the links between the individual and community, and how each can 
affect the other. 
Given the link between an ethics of eudaimonia and the idea of the shape or structure 
of a life, it follows that both the aesthetic and political dimensions of the flourishing 
life may be greatly assisted if at least some teaching and learning takes place through 
the hearing or enacting of stories. Although in what follows I have, for the sake of 
clarity, initially separated form from content in considering the potential educational 
benefits of ancient philosophy, we will increasingly see that the two are intimately 
intertwinedȯwhich is precisely what we would expect to find in an ethical 
approach based on the narrative of a life. 
 
The role of Greek philosophy in education: Development of rational and 
emotional skills 
These, then, are the main educational requirements which arise from an ethical 
approach founded on a suitably reworked notion of eudaimonia. In this section and 
the next I aim to show that such requirements can most effectively be met by the 
                                                          
10 Kristjánsson (2017) is particularly strong on the political and civic preconditions for flourishing. 
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inclusion of at least some Greek philosophy (not just that of Plato) in both primary 
and secondary education. I am not suggesting that teachers work through entire 
Greek texts with their pupils and students, even in translation: such an approach 
would not be suitable until at least the mid-teens. Rather, my suggestion is that the 
treasure house of Greek philosophy can be explored for particular concepts, 
arguments, methods of argumentation and debate, images, puzzles, examplars and 
stories, either to be taught in dedicated philosophy and critical thinking classes 
(whether examined or unexamined) or woven imaginatively into other subject 
classes, starting from as young as seven or even earlier. It may be objected that the 
Greeks themselves do not appear to have advocated philosophical studies until the 
teenage years (even later in the Republic),11 but I do not believe that this matters: my 
argument is simply that Greek philosophy is a supremely useful pedagogic resource, 
including for primary school children, whether or not the Greeks viewed it as such.  
Some of the potential educational benefits to be gained from deploying Greek 
philosophy in various ways are distinctive to Greek philosophy, whereas others are 
shared with all or most philosophers; it is the entire Greek package that is unique, 
not every element within the package. A benefit that it shares with almost all 
philosophy is the training it provides in the analysis of concepts: the majority of 
Platonic dialogues, for instance, focus on the analysis of an ethical or aesthetic 
concept, such as justice, courage or beauty.12 Again, as in almost all philosophy, 
Greek philosophy enables children to construct and analyse both deductive and 
inductive arguments.13 An example of the former might be:  
major premise:   all humans are mortal 
minor premise:   Socrates is a human 
conclusion:   Socrates is mortal 
  
                                                          
11 In the Republic the character of Socrates does not introduce dialectic into the curriculum of the 
trainee philosopher-rulers until their thirties (537d) Ȯbut this is undercut by the fact that in a 
number of the dialogues, such as the Lysis, Socrates engages quite young teenagers in philosophical 
debate (and the slave-boy in the Meno may be younger still). 
12 Debated, respectively, in the Republic, Laches and Symposium. 
13 As dǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȂȱPrior Analytics and Posterior Analytics (see particularly 
Posterior Analytics 71a8-b8 and 81a38-b9 where Aristotle clearly distinguishes deductive and 
inductive forms of reasoning). I am certainly not suggesting that these highly advanced texts be 
studied in schools; my point is simply that, as with almost all philosophy, any exposure to Greek 
philosophy is a good training for a young person in different modes of reasoning.  
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and an example of the latter: 
major premise:  to date, the sun has risen every new day 
minor premise:  tomorrow is a new day 
conclusion:   the sun will rise tomorrow 
The acquisition of such logical tools is vital if children are going to learn how to 
reason, analyse and ask good questions. Yet perhaps equally important in its 
capacity to develop and hone rational capabilities is a feature of Greek philosophy 
that is particularly distinctive to it, namely the very variety of styles in which it is 
written. To take just four examples: we have the dialogues of Plato, which seek to 
represent in writing the oral debates in which the historical Socrates engaged with 
his fellow citizens; the paradoxes of Zeȱ ǻȁȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃ; 
ȁȱ ȱ e is eqȱ ȱ ȱ ȂǼǲ the paradoxes and aphorisms of Heraclitus 
(ȁthe road up and down is one and the sameȂǲȱ ȁ	ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ
ǰȱ ȱȱȱǳȂ); and the epic hexameters of Parmeȱǻȁȱ¢ȱȱ
not recognize that which is not ǳȦȱȱ¢ȱȱȂǼǯȱWe will discuss some 
of the content of these philosophers in the next section; my point here is that 
encountering this wide diversity of styles serves three crucial purposes. Firstly, they 
are fun and engaging in themselves, and attractive to young minds; secondly, they 
positively invite interpretation, questions and debate. Finally, the sheer variety of 
them helps develop suppleness of mind in pupils and, as they grow older, 
encourages them to reflect on what philosophy itself is, and on what forms it may 
take.  
ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱ ȱȱ
imaginative capacities, there is the potential for character development too. The 
dialogues of Plato in particular exemplify that philosophy is often most fruitfully 
undertaken in debate with others, and by engaging in such philosophic dialogue 
themselves pupils can hone both their specific philosophic skills and, more 
generally, improve their social skills and increase their social confidence. They can 
come to appreciate that a good philosopher knows how to listen as well as talk. And 
we should note that the debates in Plato can be truly robust: he makes sure that the 
main character (usually Socrates) has to converse with genuinely tough opponents, 
whose views and manner (at least initially) are sometimes positively hostile to 
Socrates (see Hobbs 2017). Again, given current worries about the dangers of 
interacting on social media exclusively with those who agree with you and in 
consequence inhabiting an isolated echo-chamber, the way in which the character of 
Socrates is shown taking on all-comers is refreshing and helpful. Children and 
¢ȱȱȱȱ  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young people can learn that it is possible to disagree with someone, even robustly, 
without actually shouting, let alone coming to blows.14 Furthermore, the fact that 
Plato never appears as a speaking character in any of his dialogues means that we 
can never know for sure whether he agrees without qualification with any of the 
views that his characters express, even those of Socrates.15 Again, the distance that 
Plato is careful to create between himself as author and his dramatis personae 
positively invites discussion and debate: it is a distance which opens up a space for 
future readers and hearers, including pupils just starting out on their philosophical 
journeys. It encourages them to think actively for themselves and question supposed 
authority figures (something that teenagers in particular are usually more than 
willing to do), but, crucially, question them in a reasoned, rigorous and constructive 
way. 
 
The role of Greek philosophy in education: Content 
Greek philosophy in general is also a treasure trove in terms of its content (though, 
as we touched on above, it will become increasingly clear how often form and 
content merge in Greek thought, as indeed elsewhere). Unlike some other eras in the 
history of philosophy, it is unashamedly bold about tackling big questions with 
gusto, and thus taps into young peopleȂs natural curiosity, imagination and 
intellectual zest; in the case of younger children in particular, it also speaks to their 
lack of self-consciousness about asking such big questions. Aristotle begins his 
Metaphysics by saying that philosophy begins with a sense of wonder and his own 
and other Greeȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ¢ȱ  witness to that. What really exists? 
How do we know that it exists and how do we know that we know? What are time 
and space? What makes me me? Furthermore, as we have already begun to see, it 
tackles these fundamental issues in ways which are hugely appealing to both 
primary and secondary school pupils: paradoxes, puzzles and puns; vivid aphorisms 
and powerful images; fabulous stories and resonant myths. If you are investigating 
ȱȱǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȂȱ¡ȱȱȱȱǱȱȱ
cannot overtake the tortoise; the moving arrow is motionless. Or if you are starting 
to explore questions of identity, Heraclitus is ideal (and, like Zeno, conveniently 
memorable): you cannot step into the same river twice; the sun is new every day. In 
                                                          
14 Not that all philosophers have avoided this in practice, of course: Wittgenstein, for instance, 
allegedly once threatened Popper with a poker (alleged at least by Popper). But the possibility and 
indeed probability of non-violent disagreement remains. 
15 ȱ¢ȱȱȱȁȂȱ ȱȱȱȱǱȱApology řŞȱǻȱȱȂȱǼȱȱ
Phaedo śşȱǻȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱǼǯ 
¢ȱȱȱȱ  ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱŚǻŘǼ 
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my experience, the paradoxes concerning identity work well even with quite young 
children of seven or so upwards; as for older students, an otherwise disaffected 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ 
Ȃȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ǳȱ
ȁimmortals are mortals, mortals immortalsǰȱ ȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱǯȂȱȱ
how better than to direct the attention of young minds onto issues surrounding truth 
ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ¡Ǳȱ ȁȱ  ¢ Ȃ? For children and 
young people raised on Harry Potter, Doctor Who, The Hunger Games and The Lord of 
the Rings, imaginative leaps through time and space into fantastical other worlds are 
an enticing challenge, not an obstacle. Tackling such profound conundra fulfils the 
 ȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȂȱ
intellectual potential, and doing it in such an enjoyable way that the classroom 
becomes not only a preparation for future flourishing as an adult, but a place where 
the child can flourish as a child.  
And the ideas sown into a young child can remain embedded deep inside them and 
grow and blossom later in unexpected ways. When my daughter (I have her 
permission to recount this story) was about seven, she had to attend an 
undergraduate lecture I was giving on Parmenides and ȱ ȱȱȁnot-beingȂ one 
half term. I had given her colouring books and so on, but I noticed her watching me 
 ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ¢ǯȱȱ ȱȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
think nothing, and to give the students a way ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȁȱ¡Ȃȱ
ȱȁȱȱȱ¡Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱe sentences for a few minutes. 
I then put inverted commas around the worȱȁȂȱȱȱǱȱȁȃȄȱ
¡ȂȱȱȁȃȄȱȱȱ¡Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
made a difference. My daughter was still attentive, still with a beady eye. Later that 
evening I heard her gleefully telling someone that she had found out what her mum 
ȱȱ Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂǯȱShe thought this a great joke for 
several years, but when she started at secondary school and became very interested 
in physics, she wrote, entirely of her own volition, an essay on whether existence can 
be ascribed to black holes. I asked whether she had remembered anything of the 
Parmenides lecture years before and, rather reluctantly, she admitted that she had. 
We should never underestimate what even quite young children can grasp, or 
partially grasp, and how those planted seeds can develop deep roots and produce, 
even years later, fine blossom and nourishing fruit. 
 
The shape of a life 
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When we turn to the ethical and political resources of Greek philosophy, the 
willingness of Greek thinkers to ask the fundamental questions is again refreshingly 
apparent, and the questions they ask show how closely notions of form and content 
are intertwined in Greek thought. What is the good life and is it the good or the bad 
people who get to live it? What is the relation between goodness and beauty, or 
goodness and pleasure? How can we best live together? And, as we touched on 
above, Greek philosophy is especially useful as it often deploys historical, fictional 
and mythical examples of characters and lives to help us understand what kind of 
model of flourishing we find attractive and how best to achieve it (and, just as 
saliently, what to avoid). ȂȱRhetoric Book 2, for example, is brimming with 
such case studies. These exempla and stories allow (perhaps mainly slightly older) 
pupils to start to form the notions of the narrative shape and structure of the well-
lived life that we saw at the outset are integral to any ethics and politics of 
flourishing. They are also, of course, naturally appealing to imaginative young 
minds and, properly handled, excellent pedagogic tools. The use of exempla in 
education, of course, is not without its pitfalls, as Carr and Davis (2007) have 
eloquently exposed: what if the impressionable young mind is attracted to the 
apparent glamour of evil? But although such dangers can never be entirely 
eliminated, they can, I think, be substantially reduced if the teacher makes sure that 
a wide variety of characters and lives is made available to the class and, crucially, 
that there is rigorous discussion of those on offer, and a thoughtful consideration of 
where the different characters are heading, of how their lives turn out. 
Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
established fictional and mythical exempla, but he often invents new myths and 
legends as well, such as the powerful and moving Allegory of the Cave in Republic 7, 
in which our shadowy, imprisoned existence in the cave of the phenomenal world is 
vividly contrasted with the sunlit, liberated life of those who escape the cave by 
means of philosophy. Other resonant examples are the ladder of love in the 
Symposium, which the philosopher must ascend to glimpse perfect Beauty, and the 
exhilarating image of the flying philosophic lover in the Phaedrus, to whom eros has 
given wings. Children and young people also much enjoy discussing the moral 
ȱȱȂȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ	¢Ȃȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ
able to make himself invisible with the help of a magical ring that he finds; within a 
month he has murdered the king, married the queen and is lording it over Lydia.16 
Most importantly of allȯand a key instance of how form and content can mergeȯis 
                                                          
16 Cave: Republic 514a-518c; ladder of love: Symposium 210a-212a; the flying philosopher: Phaedrus: 
251a- ŘśŘǲȱ	¢ȂȱǱȱRepublic 359c-360d (the story first appears in Herodotus 1.8-14). 
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the dialogue format itself, through which Plato depicts a large and diverse cast of 
characters, and thereby provides a wide variety of possible role models and life 
models for our consideration (immoral and amoral as well as virtuous). We can 
reflect on the assorted attractions and dangers represented by, for example, Socrates, 
prepared to stand at his philosophic post until the hemlock-induced end; Callicles, 
arguing that it is simply a matter of natural justice that the strong man should have 
more power, wealth and pleasure than others; Thrasymachus, cynically portraying 
all man-made justice as nothing more than the interest of those in political office; or 
Alcibiades, rejecting philosophy for an unstable mix of public glory and private 
unrequited love.17 Plato shows us, brilliantly, how what we believe affects how we 
live and who we are, and how who we are and how we live affects what we believe. 
This intricate intertwining of belief, character and life is also used as a test of belief: if 
you decline to live it then you do not really believe it. Furthermore, the fact that he is 
writing in the fourth century BC but setting almost all his dialogues in the previous 
century, when Socrates was still alive, allows him to make full ironical use of the 
time gap and exploit the fact that in many cases his contemporary audience knows 
what happened to the historical sources of his fictional characters after the fictional 
dialoȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
allusions in the Symposium ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ŚŗŜȱ Ǽȱ ȱ Ȃȱ
chaotic and treacherous future and untimely end, murdered by a Persian agent with 
probable Spartan connivance in 404 BC.18 I am not of course suggesting that all these 
ironic details would or should be picked up by any but the oldest of school pupils, or 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǲȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ
technique allows us both to glimpse a life at a particular moment, and also to get a 
sense of how it turned out later. Plato himself is acutely aware of the potential 
problems that Carr and Davis outline surrounding the deployment of examples, and 
is careful to provide or at least delicately suggest the context that will allow for some 
judicious assessment. 
Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ
alluded to, springs in part from a crucial element of the tripartite psychology of his 
mature middle period that we touched on at the outset.19 In works such as the 
Republic, Phaedrus and Timaeus the psyche is not just divided into two, reason and the 
appetites, as it had been in the earlier Gorgias for instance: a third, and vitally 
                                                          
17 Socrates: passim, but see particularly Apology 28b-30c; Callicles: Gorgias 481c-492c; Thrasymachus: 
Republic 336b-339a; Alcibiades: Symposium 212c-223a.  
18 See Hobbs Plato and the Hero (2000, pp. 258-261). 
19 p. 2 and n. 3. 
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important, motivational set is introduced, a spirited element called the thumos or 
thumoeides, which desires respect, honour, success and glory (Plato portrays 
Alcibiades, for example, as chiefly driven by it). But if the yearning for honour is one 
of our deepest psychological needs, how should we go about acquiring it? The 
easiest route, as Plato is well aware, is to emulate those whom our society (or a 
relevant sub-section of it) already honours. This is another reason why his ethics of 
flourishing leads swiftl¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ
models, such as Achilles and Odysseus, and why he quickly realises that he needs to 
create new role models, such as Socrates (see Hobbs 2000, especially 235-249). He 
also, of course, comes to the drastic conclusion that new role models will need a new 
society to endorse them, and in which they can more easily be emulated. Clearly, 
teachers in contemporary classrooms cannot undertake such radical social reform;20 
but they can learn much from Plato about the central psychological importance of 
role models and the need, at the very least, to expose children to a wide range of 
possible models, some of them perhaps taken from Plato, and encourage them to 
discuss their merits and flaws ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȂȱ ȱ. 
 
Ancient Greek philosophy and moral development 
Philosophy in general, then, is one of the best subjects for showing young people 
that there are different ways of living, being and thinking than those immediately on 
offer in their local postcode; it can extend their imaginative grasp of possible lives. 
We are not just the product of our genes21 and environment: reason can provide at 
least a partial way out, but only if reason is properly trained. A number of subjects, 
of course, can offer both different models for thinking and being and some rational 
training in how to assess them, but I would argue that philosophy is at least as good 
as history, geography or literature at providing the former, and better equipped to 
provide rigorous training in the latter. Furthermore, it is clear that in this case as well 
form and content are not only both crucial to the liberation that well-taught and 
deployed philosophy can facilitate, but that they are intimately intertwined. The 
                                                          
20 The role of teachers as potential social reformers is interestingly discussed by Kristjánsson (2017, pp. 
93-95). 
21 The Greeks, in so far as they attributed characteristics to inheritance at all, variously attributed them 
ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȁȂȱȱȱ Ǳȱǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱTimaeus; 
Aristotle On the Generation of Animals and Parts of Animals. In the mostly late 5th century Hippocratic 
corpus, inherited characteristics are discussed in On Generation, The Nature of the Child and On 
Regimen, while in the Hippocratic Airs, Waters, Places, physical and character traits are said to be 
largely dependent on environment. 
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form taken by the narrative of a different life is in itself part of that life: it is only by 
considering the narrative as a whole that young people can start to get an 
understanding of what a flourishing life or a stunted or warped life might look like, 
and what kind of intellectual, emotional and physical faculties need to be developed, 
and what intellectual and moral virtues fostered, in order to help a person live the 
former and avoid the latter.22 
Furthermore, both Plato and Aristotle (in so far as he employs exempla, even though 
he does not of course write in dialogue form) do not want this understanding to take 
place solely at an intellectual level: they are both clear that it is desire that propels 
action, and they want their readers and hearers to be emotionally attracted to what 
they believe to be flourishing and worthwhile lives, and repelled by the reverse; and 
the models they create and use work at least as powerfully at an affective level, on 
our emotional understanding. In addition, as Ȃimpio and Peterson eloquently 
attest (2017, this special issue), imaginative engagement with various charactersȯ
whether in philosophical dramas or other forms of art and story-tellingȯcan directly 
assist in the moral development of sympathy, empathy and compassion in 
particular.23 It might perhaps be claimed that such a result, though highly desirable, 
is nevertheless a modern aim, and not one that Plato himself particularly sought. 
However, even if this were true, it would not matter: as I have already made clear, 
the benefits of deploying Greek philosophy in teaching in various direct and indirect 
ways do not all need to have been acknowledged as benefits by the Greeks 
themselves. Furthermore, in this instance the charge is not in any case entirely 
accurate. Although concern and pity for the weak and vulnerable is admittedly less 
prized by Plato than by many contemporary societies, it is not true that he is 
uninterested in, still less contemptuous of, empathy and compassion. At Republic 
463e-464a, for example, the character of Socrates says that in the ideally just state that 
he is describing the citizens will share in the successes and misfortunes of fellow-
£ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȁ¢ȱȂȱȱ
ȁ¢ȱȂǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ
fellow-ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱdepicting his ideal state in the form of an 
emotionally engaging dramatic dialogue rather than a plain monograph. Aristotle, 
                                                          
22 Although his interest is in the pedagogic potential of the personal narratives of students, Harrelson 
(2012) offers a thoughtful examination of the role of narratives in philosophy courses, and the way 
in which the form of the narrative is intrinsic to an understanding of its content. 
23 Harrelson (2012) also highlights increased empathy as one of the two main benefits produced by 
narrative pedagogy (the other is self-knowledge).  
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too, emphasises the central role that sympathy plays in friendship in the Art of 
Rhetoric 2.4: 
it necessarily follows that he is a friend who shares our joy in good fortune and 
our sorrow in affliction, for our own sake and not for any other reason. 
He also discusses the value of pity in the Art of Rhetoric 2.8, and pity is of course one 
of the two main emotions, along with fear, that he claims in the Art of Poetry to be 
stirred by the watching and acting out of tragic drama. For our present purposes, it 
is particularly telling that both these Aristotelian works not only argue that fellow-
feeling and pity are developed in us partly through the power of ȱ Ȃȱ
stories, but often appeal to fictional, mythological and historical examples 
themselves. 
 
Philosophy in schools and 21st century challenges 
Up to this point the potential benefits of incorporating some Greek philosophy into 
curricula and lesson plans have been of perennial application. In this final section, I 
want to consider ways in which some acquaintance with philosophy in general and 
Greek philosophy in particular can help children and young people flourish in the 
specific conditions of the early 21st century, and indeed tackle some of its specific 
challenges. One of the most pressing of these is the way philosophy can provide 
young people with the mental resources which may assist them to resist 
indoctrination. Training in rational thinking and questioning is of course something 
which Greek philosophy shares with most philosophical traditions; as I have 
suggested, however, the Greeks deliver such training in forms particularly appealing 
to the young, and this is important: we need to start to educate children in primary 
school in the analysis of concepts and the construction and analysis of arguments, in 
order to enable them to question authority figures, and to ask themselves whether 
there is any good reason why the particular pronouncement of a particular authority 
figure should be believed. Such figures might be mainstream teachers or politicians, 
or they might be religious or nationalist extremists, and acquiring the resources to 
assess what they are saying is vital even if in some cases the questions cannot 
immediately be articulated out loud by the young person out of safety concerns. 
Philosophy, I would suggest, is one of the best ways of helping children resist 
attempts to indoctrinate them, and it needs to be introduced early into schools 
precisely because indoctrination attempts also start when the child is very young. An 
additional advantage is that philosophy teaching seems to me a much more inclusive 
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ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱŚǻŘǼ 
33 
approach than the British 	Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ strategy, which aims to 
identify and engage with people believed to be at risk of becoming involved in 
terrorism and is at least potentially divisive. The British ȱȱȂȱ
own research in 2010 suggested a link between Philosophy for Children (P4C) and 
protection against indoctrination,24 and similar thinking seems to have informed a 
2015 British Council working paper on education and extremism (Rose 2015), which 
calls for greatly increased provision of teaching in the humanities in the Middle East 
and North Africa (the need for philosophy is specifically mentioned on p. 14). It 
would be very good to see more studies undertaken in this area, and I note that the 
Nuffield Foundation is currently undertaking research on the non-cognitive impacts 
of philosophy teaching in primary schools, analysing the data provided by the 
Education Endowment Foundation (EEF) and Durham University 2015 project, 
which had originally looked at the effects of P4C in reading, writing and maths in a 
cohort of 48 schools.25 It is very encouraging too that the EEF together with the 
National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) is in the process of initiating a 
greatly expanded version of the 2015 project, this time involving 200 schools, which 
will from the outset assess the non-cognitive impact of P4C teaching as well as 
progress in reading, writing and maths, and general learning and teaching.26 
As stated, these general resources can be found in most philosophical traditions, 
even if they are deployed in particularly appealing form in Greek philosophy. 
However, there are two respects in which Greek philosophy could be especially 
helpful in negotiating current religious tensions. Firstly, it offers to some extent a 
shared cultural resource which can be of great use in contemporary inter-faith, or 
faith-secular, scenarios: although many ancient philosophers were profoundly 
religiousȯand Plato is one of themȯthey did not, at least in the classical and 
Hellenistic periods, espouse any of the current dominant world religions.27 Greek 
philosophy thus provides a relatively inclusive space in which people can vigorously 
debate profound ethical, religious and metaphysical issues without feeling so keenly 
that their specific religious beliefs and identities are being immediately threatened. It 
                                                          
24 Bonnell, Copestake, Kerr, Passy, Reed, Salter, Sarwar & Sheikh (2010; see particularly the summary 
of the P4C case study, pp. 122-130).  
25 The draft report on non-cognitive impact of P4C: http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/non-cognitive-
impacts-philosophy-children. The original analysis of the 2015 cohort in terms of progress in 
reading, writing and maths: https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/our-
work/projects/philosophy-for-children. 
26 https://www.nfer.ac.uk/schools/taking-part-in-our-research/eeps/ 
27 Although Judaism was of course in existence at the time, none of the Greek philosophers of the 
period was Jewish. 
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is of course true that it is the foundation of the tradition of Western rationalism, and 
many do not wish to situate themselves within such a tradition; nevertheless, it is 
worth bearing in mind that not all Greek (and later Roman) philosophers lived 
within the confines of modern Europe, and not all were white. Furthermore, we owe 
the preservation of the Greek corpus to Islamic scholars such as Al-Farabi and 
Averroes (Ibn Rushd), who also did much to enrich the tradition with their own 
original thought. 
The second respect in which Greek philosophy can help us negotiate current 
religious tensions is that most of its practitioners saw no conflict between religion 
ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ǳȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¡ample, the 
mathematical and physical laws which he believed shaped the cosmos are in 
themselves the best possible evidence of the divine in action. The view that there is a 
divine controlling intelligence (nous) and that the cosmos is divinely ordered can be 
found in many of his dialogues;28 it is of course not necessary to follow Plato in his 
specific religious beliefs to take on board the fundamental point that 
philosophic/scientific and religious approaches can be compatible. 
Philosophy in general and Greek philosophy in particular can also assist with 
another of the chief challenges of our times: the training they offer in conceptual 
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱ in epistemology that they may 
ignite can also help counter the current disturbing fashion for claiming that we live 
ȱ ȱ ȁ-Ȃȱ ȱ ȁ-trȂȱ  ǯȱ Such claims are extremely inchoate, and 
perhaps all the more dangerous for that. Is the assertion that facts are unimportant 
and to be disregarded? Or that an individual creates his or her own reality? Or even 
that there is no such thiȱȱ ȁȂȱȱ ȁȂȱȱǵ Deciding what is to count as a 
ȁȂȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱand, again, 
it is good to encourage children to start their exploration of such questions young, as 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȁ-Ȃȱȱȁ-Ȃȱȱ
arguably self-refuting: is not the user of such phrases claiming that this very state of 
affairs is itself a fact, is itself true? Again, while almost all philosophical traditions 
can assist a young person to begin examining such claims, Greek philosophy is an 
enticing introduction: the paradoxes of Heraclitus and Zeno that we have already 
touched on can encourage a child to start puzzling about what to believe and why to 
                                                          
28 e.g. Phaedo 97b-98b; Philebus 28d-30e; Laws 967d-e; the mathematical nature of this ordering is 
particularly emphasised in the Timaeus (passim). See Hobbs (2017). 
¢ȱȱȱȱ  ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱŚǻŘǼ 
35 
believe it, and older children and teenagers can be invited to consider a summary29 
of Ȃȱ¢ȱȱwhy he believes ȂȱȁȱȱȱȂȱȱto be 
ultimately self-refuting (for the same reason as above, namely that Ȃȱȱ
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
are not, that they are notȂȱȱȱȱȱȱnted as an objective truth, the 
one reality that is not created by the whims of individual humans or groups of 
them).  
Finally, as we have seen, philosophy in schools does not simply help young people 
spot and avoid various dangers; it can also provide them with something positive to 
sustain them. If we return to our starting point of an ethics and politics of 
flourishing, one of its great strengths is that it encourages young people to develop a 
conception of flourishing which is both strong and flexible. The strength comes from 
foundations and a framework which are clear and robust enough to stand firm in an 
increasingly uncertain world; the flexibility derives from the fact that the ways in 
which the actualization of potential can be understood and made manifestȯthe 
pictures of flourishing individual and communal lives that comprise the specific 
contents of the structural frameworkȯare adaptable to changing historical, political 
and geographical circumstances, and advances in biological and psychological 
understanding. As a result, it is an ethical framework which can accommodate, and 
indeed facilitate, the suppleness and agility of mind which uncertain times require, 
and which are plainly currently required in the great global shifts of the early 21st 
century, both in the workplace and beyond. 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up: for all the above reasons, both the study of philosophy in schools and the 
studying of other subjects philosophically can add zest and interest to the years of 
education in themselves, and also provide some grasp of what constitutes a 
flourishing life and an imaginative appreciation of a range of such lives that will 
provide those leaving school with lasting support. In addition it can offer the kind of 
training in mental rigour, precision, flexibility and resilience that the 21st century so 
clearly requires. Many philosophers and philosophical approaches can be fruitfully 
deployed, but as an overall package ancient Greek philosophy is of particular use to 
the educator, especially as some of its elements can appeal to primary school 
                                                          
29 ȱ¢ȱȁ¢ȂǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱ-Measure doctrine in his 
Theaetetus is highly complex, and would be beyond all but the most gifted school student. But the 
basic gist of his final refutation can be clearly grasped by an attentive teenager. 
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children. Such philosophical studies do not all need to be examined: when Socrates 
claims at Apology řŞȱȱȁȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
in mind the current regime of frequent tests for the very youngȯin the U.K. at least 
ȯa regime that can risk draining all the fun out of learning and exploring.30 I submit 
that a greater provision of philosophy in schools, and in particular greater use of the 
rich resources of ancient Greek philosophy, would facilitate both the immediate 
living and the developing understanding of a good life by all who studied and 
taught it, and would nourish and sustain both pupils and teachers and help prepare 
them for what may well prove to be turbulent years ahead. 
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